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INTERNAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM THE UNDISTPJBUTED
PROFITS TAX OF 1936-1937
ABSTRACT
Recent theoretical approaches have linked shifts in firms'internalfunds and investment
spending, holding constant underlying investment opportunities. An important impediment to
convincing tests of these models is the lack of firm-level data on the relative costs of internal and
external funds. We use a tax experiment, the Surtax on Undistributed Profits (SUP) in the 1930s,
to identify firms' relative cost of internal and external funds and analyze its effect on firms'
investment decisions. Firms' responses to the surtax on retained earnings permit estimation of
shadow price differentials between internal and external finance, and measurement of the link
between access to capital markets and investment.
Almost one-fourth of the 273 publicly-traded manufacturing firms in our sample retained in
excess of 40 percent of their earnings in spite of the surtax, paying the highest marginal rates of
surtax. The investment spending of these firms was sensitive to shifts in cash flow, holding
constant investment opportunities (measured by the ratio of market-to-book value). No sensitivity
of investment to internal funds could be detected for firms with higher dividend payout and lower
surtax liability. In addition, many firms with high marginal rates of surtax were in the growth
industries of the day. The sensitivity of investment spending to internal funds for firms with high
marginal surtax rates appears mainly to reflect information-related capital-market frictions as
opposed to the waste of corporate cash flows by entrenched managers.
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Recent theoretical work on the financing of investment under asymmetric information has
emphasized the existence of a shadow price differential between internal finance (retained
earnings) and external finance (debt and stock flotations). 'Lemons premia in equity
markets (as in Myers and Majluf, 1984), and credit rationing or loan mispricing (as in Jaffee
and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Williamson, 1986;
Bernanke and Gertler, 1990; and Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990) imply that external finance
will be more costly than internal finance (for a review see Gertler, 1988). Moreover, the
shadow price differential between internal and external finance will vary across firms
depending on the relative degree of information asymmetry, and differences in simple
transacting costs. Recent empirical research using data from the post-World War II period
has found much evidence for the importance of this Cost wedge between internal and external
finance in explaining firm heterogeneity in investment behavior, and aggregate sensitivity of
investment to cash flow (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein, 1991; Whited, 1990; Himmelberg, 1990; and Gilchrist, 1990). This new body
of theoretical and empirical work has formalized and quantified arguments which have a long
history in the investment literature (see Butters and Lintner, 1945; and Meyer and Kuh,
1957).
In this paper, we employ a new firm-level data set to measure the importance of the
shadow price differential between internal and external finance for explaining investment of
U.S. manufacturing firms during the rapid recovery, and subsequent recession, of 1933-
1938. Our data allow us to investigate the effects of financial constraints on firm growth
during the expansion, and to take advantage of the heterogeneity in our sample to discoverwhich firmswere most sensitive to cash flow disturbances (changesinthesupply of internal
finance).
What has been lacking in existing studies using firm-level data is a firm-level index of
the marginal costs of external finance. For example, studies using the Q-theory approach
model investment as being determined by beginning-of-period Q(tocontrol for investment
opportunities) and a measure of internal funds. For firms with high costs of borrowing (due
to asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders regarding firm prospects),
investment will exhibit excessive sensitivity to cash flow, holding Qconstant.'In existing
studies low initial dividend payout ratios or small firm size are typically used as proxies for
high costs of external finance. In this paper, we are able to estimate the costs of external
finance directly by examining firms' responses to a unique tax experiment' in U.S. history,
the Undistributed Profits Tax (or Surtax on Undistributed Profits) of 1936l937.2 This tax
was a surtax on corporate retentions over and above normal corporate taxes. Because the
maximum marginal tax rate was 27 percent, most firms had large incentives to change their
payout policies. Working against this response for some firms is the potential difference in
the cost of internal and external funds. To the extent that the marginal cost of external funds
is high, a growing firm with profitable investment opportunities might choose to pay the
undistributed profits tax and invest its internal funds, rather than distribute funds and then
reacquire them in the capital market. Under certain assumptions, the observed undistributed
profits tax payments for such firms can be used to approximate the differential cost of
external finance, and variation in the response to the tax across firms can be related to
variations in investment behavior.3Our study of the undistributed profits tax, and its implications for measuring the Costs of
external finance, is also motivated by a specific interest in the macroeconomic events of the
1930s. The timing of the undistributed profits tax experiment is fortuitous, since the
protracted recovery from the Great Depression has been attributed by Fisher (1933) and
Bernanke (1983) to increases in the costs of external finance. Bernanke stressed increases in
the 'cost of credit intermediation' which resulted from deflation-induced reductions in firms'
net worth (which reduced firms' creditworthiness in the presence of leverage constraints),
and the weakening and partial destruction of the banking system from 1930 to 1933.
Bernanke points to time-series evidence of links between credit supply shocks (deflation and
default premia) and investment, and to the large excess reserve holdings of commercial banks
to argue for the importance of credit constraints in limiting investment. Clearly, a cross-
sectional analysis of the role of external finance constraints in determining investment would
provide the perfect test of the importance of credit costs, as described by Fisher and
Bernanke.4
Section II reviews the history of the surtax on undistributed profits, describes its
incidence on firms of different sizes, and explains our method for identifying the marginal
cost differential between external and internal finance. Section III describes our dataset. In
section IV, we provide some basic summary statistics on the characteristics of firms with
high costs of external finance, as measured by undistributed profits tax margins. We argue
that the differences between firms with high and low costs of external finance mainly reflect
information-related capital-market frictions as opposed to the waste of corporate cash flow by
entrenched managers. Section V reports regression results relating investment behavior
3(particularly cash-flow sensitivity) to differences in the costs of external finance. We find
that a neoclassical investment model with no explicit capital-market frictions cannot be
rejected except for firms with high surtax margins. The investment spending of those firms
displayed excess sensitivity to internal funds. In addition, working capital accumulation was
responsive to cash flow only for high-tax margin firms, suggesting the use of working capital
to smooth fixed capital investment when external finance is costly. In section VI, we show
that industries with the highest proportions of firms with high tax margins were among the
fastest growing of the day. Section VII concludes.
II. MEASURING FINANCE COSTS USING UNDISTRIBUTED PROFIT TAX MARGINS
A. The Tax Experiment
The surtax on undistributed profits (SUP) was created to restrict corporate discretion
over retained earnings. Unlike the current accumulated earnings tax the SUP taxed all of
retained earnings, including funds used to finance investment projects. By taxing retained
earnings it was thought that firm managers would be forced to face the discipline of the
capital market to finance their investments, thus making the capital allocation process more
efficient (see Berle and Means, 1932, Tugwell, 1933, Hazelett, 1936, and Buehler, l937).
The logic of this argument is quite similar to recent theoretical models of 'free cash flow'
that emphasize potential agency problems between management and shareholders of mature
firms (for example, Easterbrook, 1984, and Jensen, 1986).
The Surtax on Undistributed Profits appears to have been unanticipated (see the
discussion in Blakey and Blakey, 1936). No reference was made to it in President
4Roosevelt's budget messages of June 1935 or January 1936. The proposal was presented by
the President in a special message to Congress on March 3, 1936, in which he announced the
need for the tax as a revenue-raising device. Strong opposition by key Congressional
factions and lobbying efforts by business groups to repeal the surtax led to early amendment
and repeal of the surtax. The surtax survived in its original form through 1937. By 1938,
legislative amendments reduced substantially the effective surtax rate. The tax expired
formally in December 1939, in accordance with the Revenue Act of 1938. At the time, most
observers seemed to agree that the tax had a significant effect on dividend payouts only in
1936 and 1937 (see Thorp and George, 1937; Kendrick, 1937; and Lent, 1948).
The Roosevelt Administration proposed the SUP as a substitute for the corporate income
tax (which would have avoided the double taxation of dividends), but Congress added it to
the existing corporate tax as a surtax on retained earnings. From the beginning there were
protests against the tax, particularly from small, growing enterprises. These firms
complained that the tax discriminated against growing firms with high costs of external
finance. Responses to a Brookings Institution survey of firms in 1937 (Kendrick, 1937)
contained many such complaints. In one case a large, dominant firm noted that it had gained
a competitive advantage as the result of its low financing costs, given the greater incidence of
the tax on its smaller and younger competitors. The large firm (perhaps uncharacteristically)
argued that this was an unfair advantage and suggested repeal of the tax. Many annual
corporate reports for 1936 contained special statements discussing and criticizing the new
tax. As a result of these protests the tax was repealed in 1938 (see also Lent, 1948; and
Dobrovolsky, 1951).
SThe computation of a firm's SUP liability followed a simple rule. The marginal tax rate
was progressive as a function of the percentage of earnings retained out of corporate income
(after subtracting regular corporate incorne tax paid). On the first 10 percent of earnings
retained a firm would pay 7 percent of retained earnings in tax. On the next 10 percent it
would pay 12 percent of retained earnings. On retentions of between 20 and 40 percent of
income a 17 percent marginal tax rate applied. For retentions between 40 and 60 percent of
income a 22 percent marginal tax rate was charged. On all retentions above 60 percent of
income the marginal tax rate was 27 percent. There were special exemptions (for example,
for firms with bond covenants that restricted dividend payments), and there was a small tax
credit for firms earning less than $50,000 in income.
The maximum marginal tax rate paid by a firm provides a measure of the shadow price
differential between external and internal finance costs, once one takes proper account of the
tax consequences of dividends and retentions. In the Appendix, we provide a method for
approximating the shadow price differential using the firm's maximum tax margin and
information on the tax rates applied to dividends and capital gains. For example, a firm at
the 27 percent margin paying near-zero dividends and seeking to finance new investment
projects was willing to pay 27 cents to avoid having to raise 73 cents in outside funds. We
estimate the shadow cost differential for such a firm (in present value terms) was likely in
excess of 25 percent.
Given the avoidability of the tax through dividend payments, one might expect that little
revenue was actually raised by the tax, and that very few firms paid the highest marginal
rates. While it is true that the vast majority of firms increased dividend payout rates in 1936
6to limit their tax liability under the new law, a substantial number of firms paid high
marginal SUP rates, and the revenue from the new tax was large. The SUP earned $145
million in revenue in 1936 and $176 million in 1937, compared to regular corporate tax
earnings of $950 million and $1,150 million for 1936 and 1937, respectively. As Table 1
shows, retained earnings as a percentage of after-tax income fell from 1935 to 1936 most
dramatically for the largest firms in the economy. The average retention ratio for all firms
fell from 23 percent to 15.1 percent. For firms with assets of greater than $50 million the
mean retention ratio fell from 19.8 percent to 4.9 percent. Mean retention ratios in 1936
decline with firm size, rising from 4.9 percent for the largest firms to 35.8 percent for the
smallest.
Table 2 provides complementary evidence on the distribution of highest marginal rate
paid on the SUP, conditioning on the size of firms measured by income. For firms earning
profits (and hence subject to the surtax) a substantial fraction paid marginal tax rates of 22 or
27 percent. Firms with very low incomes (less than $10,000) avoided high tax margins
mainly by applying the special tax credit available to firms with income less than $50,000.
The very largest firms also avoided the highest tax brackets, presumably because of their
lower costs of external finance. However, for income classes between $10,000 and $1
million, between 17 and 23 percent of firms paid marginal rates of 22 or 27 percent, with
roughly 10 percent of firms in the 27 percent bracket. The concentration of high margins in
middle-income ranges may also be due to differences across firm sizes in the ability of firms
to reduce measured profits by adjusting the salary-profit mix of entrepreneur-managers,
7which was especially relevant for very small firms (see Thorp and George, 1937, and
Dobrovolsky, 1951).
B. Direct Evidence of Costly External Finance in the 1930s
Independent evidence from surveys by the Securities and Exchange Commission (194 Ia,
1941b) on the cost of common stock flotation confirms that costs of issuing securities in the
1930s often were large. For example, as reported in Table 3, for a sample of 64 firms with
assets of under $5millionaverage costs of flotation ranged between 20 and 27 percent of the
value of the amount of common stock issued. Physical expenses accounted typically for
costs of 2 or 3 percent. The remainder was paid as compensation to the intermediary who
handled the issue. Underwriting insurance costs do not account for the bulk of this fee. In
1938 underwritten common stock issuers paid an average compensation of 17.5 percent of
the issued amount to brokers, while nonunderwritten common stock issuers paid 19.1 percent
on average. Recent models of information production by securities intermediaries may help
explain such high fees. According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), for example, costs of
public stock brokerage reflect substantial costs of gathering information.6
The view that costs of finance mainly reflect information costs is supported further by
comparing the broker's compensation on preferred stock and bonds with those on common
stock. Compensation for preferred stock and bonds sold to the public was substantially lower
than for common stock, and as before, was highest for nonunder\vritten issues. For
example, nonunderwritten preferred stock compensation to brokers on public issues averaged
12.2 percent in 1938 for 31 issues, compared to a 2.7 percent average for 12 underwritten
issues. For bond issues, brokers' compensation and physical expenses were roughly
Scomparable and together small in comparison to stock issue costs. These findings show that
firms faced substantially different marginal costs of finance in markets for different types of
securities. In equilibrium, low-cost forms of finance were rationed to certain firms.7
Comparisons of commissions across issues (Mendelson, 1967) and across investment banking
regimes (Calomiris, 1992) confirm the positive association between information costs and
commissions.
In summary, SEC data on the measured costs of public securities issues support the
evidence in Table 2 that a substantial number of firms faced a shadow price differential
between external and internal funds in excess of 20 percent. Furthermore, differences in
costs of finance across securities lend support to theoretical models of credit or equity
rationing based on asymmetric information, which are consistent with such market
segmentation.
IlL THE DATA
We constructed a firm-level data set combining information on income, investment,
financial structure, dividend payout, firm market values, and SUP margins for as many firms
as possible during the period of recovery from the Great Depresion. An extremely valuable
primary source for firm-level data for our period is the Survey of Listed Coroorations, which
summarizes data submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission for all publicly traded
firms. These data include detailed information from balance sheets, income and expense
statements, and records of dividend distributions.
9Five hundred twenty-eight manufacturing firms appear in the Survey dataset, which
covers the years 1934-1938 (with some limited coverage of 1939). Many of these firms,
however, did not report consistent data for the period 1935-1937, and hence were excluded
from the dataset. Other firms were excluded because they did not earn positive profits in
1936, and therefore, were not subject to the SUP. Still other firms were eliminated because
stock price data were not available (from other sources noted below) for 1935 or 1936, or
because taxation and dividend data were insufficient to calculate the maximum marginal rate
of the SUP. These various deletions left us with 273 firms.
The principal source for data on SUP taxes and dividends was Moody's Industrial
Manual (various years). In calculating dividends it was crucial to know precisely when
dividends were paid, since only dividends paid within the calendar year reduced liability for
the SUP. Furthermore, stock dividends which were not bona fide disbursements of funds did
not reduce SUP liability, so it was important to distinguish dividends by type.8 Moody's
was also a useful source of information on bond covenants; in a few cases, covenants
restricting dividends paid (which were allowed by the SUP as an exemption to the tax)
resolved seeming anomalies between the amount of SUP paid and the amount of tax liability
implied by retained earnings. Where Moody's did not report data on SUP taxes paid we
referred to individual annual reports of corporations at the Stanford Business School Library,
which accounted for roughly half of our data on SUP payments.
There are three ways to calculate a firm's maximum margin for the SUP. One needs
any two of the following pieces of information to calculate the marginal tax rate: income,
dividends, and SUP payments. To insure against error, we performed the calculations all
10three ways where possible. If any methods led to contradictory results, we \vent back to
Moody's and the annual reports to resolve the differences. If differences could not be
resolved, we dropped the firms. In a few cases, SUP payment data were not available even
though all other data were. For these firms, margins were inferred from data on dividends
arid income, and cross-checked with total corporate tax payments to ensure consistency as
best we could. We then estimated the models described in section IV with and without these
firms. The presence or absence of these firms made no difference for any of our results,
except improving our sample size and standard errors, so we included them in our sample of
273 firms.
To construct our measure of firm market values we collected end-of-year price data for
common and preferred stocks for 1935 and 1936 from the Wall Street Journal, and
supplemented these price data, where necessary, with data from other newspapers and from
If it was not possible to gauge stock prices accurately (if reported ranges of values
were large) we dropped the firm. Based on a preliminary analysis of bond price data, and
on some difficulties disentangling bond aggregates from other forms of debt, we decided to
value all debt at its face value. The small proportion of debt finance for most firms (and
much smaller proportion of bonds), along with the fact that bonds traded very near par for
the firms that issued bonds, imply that valuing debt at face value is unlikely to generate any
important bias. Quantities of each stock of each class were taken from Moody's.
One limitation of our data is the definition of investment. Our measure of investment is
the change in the book value of fixed capital (land, buildings, and equipment).
Unfortunately, gross investment data are not reported by firms. While capital stock data arenot ideal for our purposes because of possible idiosyncrasies in the measurement of
depreciation, we think the strength and robustness of the net investment regressions we report
argue for treating the change in book capital as a reasonable measure of investment.9
IV. CHARACTERIZING FIRMS WITH HIGH COSTS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE
In this section, we describe some of the salient characteristics of firms with different
external finance costs as measured by the maximum marginal rate on the SUP. These
descriptions are useful for two reasons. First, such a description can suggest whether
previous empirical studies have been correct to associate low dividend payout and small firm
size with high costs of external finance. Our direct measures of external finance costs permit
us to test the assumptions of these studies.
Second, the characteristics of finance-constrained firms can help one to distinguish
between two alternative explanations for high external finance costs which have different
posItive and normative implications. The first explanation points to asymmetry of
information between insiders and outsiders about firm opportunities. This limits the supply
of funds available to some firms, as described in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Myers and
MajIuf (1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1990). The firms
most affected presumably would be small, growing enterprises in developing industries.
Increases in internal net worth for this group of firms would have allocative benefits
(Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990).
An alternative explanation for high costs of external finance focuses instead on the
agency problem between managers and their stockholders, following the logic of Eerie and
12Means (1932), Tugwell (1933), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986). In mature
enterprises for which investment opportunities on the margin are no tonger promising,
managers may over-invest available "free cash flow.External finance is costly, not because
of adverse selection, but because outside investors are unwilling to finance low-quality
projects. Managers may prefer over-investment, when possible, because it permits
management to capture rents at the expense of stockholders. For example, according to this
"entrenched management" view, firms with greater costs of removing or disciplining
managers will tend to be the high-finance-cost firms. For these enterprises increased cash
flow will have adverse allocative consequences. The "entrenched management explanation
for high costs of finance is especially important to consider in our study, since it was central
to the rationale given for the SUP by its proponents. An important benefit of the tax was
supposed to be the elimination of the rents of entrenched management.
These alternative interpretations of high costs of external finance imply different
characteristics of firms with high financing costs. According to the asymmetric information
view, the quintessential high-surtax-margin firm would be a small, growing enterprise in a
new industry. According to the entrenched management view, high-surtax-margin firms
would tend to be large, mature firms in sunset industries with declining investment
opportunities.
In the tables that follow, we divide firms into three categories, based on their maximum
SUP margins in 1936: firms with a 12 percent or lower maximum marginal rate; firms with
a 17 percent marginal rate; and firms with a 22 or 27 percent marginal rate. These divisions
correspond to retention rates in 1936 of less than 20 percent (Type A), 20-40 percent (Type
13B), and greater than 40 percent (Type C). By grouping firms into three categories, we
economize on space and obtain large enough numbers of firms in each category to facilitate
statistical inference)0 The results we report do not differ qualitatively if we used all five
categories rather than the three used here. Our smallest cell contains the 66 firms in the
highest-surtax-margin group (Type C firms), which are roughly evenly divided between those
with maximum margins of 22 percent and 27 percent. The distribution of firms in different
types closely parallels that of Table 2 for firms of comparable size, except that Type B firms
are somewhat over-represented, and Type A firms somewhat under-represented in
comparison to the cells in Table 2. In our sample, Type A firms account for 47 percent,
Type B firms 29 percent, and Type C firms 24 percent.
In Tables 4 through 9, we report means, medians, standard deviations, and numbers of
firms in each category for various firm characteristics including firm size (total assets in
1936), profit rates (operating profits less interest payments divided by book-value net worth),
the change in operating profits divided by assets, net operating profits relative to sales, the
ratio of market to book value and its percentage change, and dividend payout for each type.
These data highlight interesting characteristics of high-finance-cost firms, and help to
discriminate between the two views of the motives behind costly retentions of profits. Table
10 provides supplementary data on median standard errors and the statistical significance of
differences in medians between Type A and Type C firms. Tests of differences across
medians are not as sensitive to outliers as comparable comparisons of differences in means.
Table 4 reports data on dividends as a percentage of after-tax profits in 1935 and 1936
for firms with positive profits. For 1936, type differences in dividend payout are present by
14construction, since low dividend payout determines firm type. For 1935, however, dividend
payout was not affected by the SUP. Table 4 shows that dividend payout in 1935 is much
lower for firms in higher SUP margins in 1936. The median ratio for Type C firms is 4
percent, compared to 51 percent for Type B firms and 70 percent for Type A firms. This
provides some support for the use of dividend payout as a conditioning variable to sort firms
according to their costs of external finance, as for example in Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988).
Table 5 reports data on firm asset size by type in 1936. As predicted by the financing-
hierarchy view, smaller firms tend to be the ones with the highest external finance costs.
These differences are large and statistically significant (see Table 10). The median firm size
for Type C firms ($6.4 million in assets) is less than one-half that of Type B, and less than
one-third that of Type A. The large standard deviations of firm size in each category,
however, indicate that there is substantial overlap in the size distributions of the different
types)' Thus firm size may be a very inexact proxy for finance costs.
Table 6 provides data on operating profits less interest divided by net worth for 1936.
Profit rates are similar across types, with Type-B firms showing higher means and medians
than Types A and C, which are roughly identical. This pattern is not consistent with viewing
Type C firms' managers as more wasteful in their use of funds, but it could be consistent
with the financing-hierarchy view. Large, mature, Type-A firms nsight be expected to have
low average rates of profit, while small growing firms, which are likely to be in the Type C
group, may have smaller profits to capital because of their small size and high ratio of fixed
to variable costs. According to this interpretation, as firms progress in the "life cycle' from
15C to B to A their average profits rise and then fall. An additional fact that is consistent with
this interpretation is that the procyclical change in profits increases in type. As Table 7
shows, Type B and Type C firms exhibit larger profit growth during the boom year of 1936,
and smaller profit growth in 1937, which saw a cyclical peak in October. Similarly, net
operating profits relative to sales in 1936 is lowest for type C firms, and these firms show
the greatest change in this ratio from 1935 to 1936)2 These differences in medians of
profit-to-sales ratios and profit growth are statistically significant, as Table 10 shows.
Table 8 examines the level and growth of the ratio of market to book value)3 While
mean and median ratios of market to book value are lower in 1936 for Type C firms (a fact
consistent with both the asymmetric information and entrenched management views)'4, the
change in the market-to-book-value ratio during 1936 for Type C firms (shown in Table 8) is
37 percent, compared to 15 and 23 percent, repectively, for Type B and A firms. These
differences in medians are statistically significant, as shown in Table 10. As Brock and
LeBaron (1990) argue, the greater procyclicality of firm valuation for Type C firms is
consistent with asymmetric information models of financing constraints (Myers and Majiuf,
1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Bernanke and Gertler, 1990; and Calomiris and Hubbard,
1990). Business cycle upswings increase available cash flow (or financial slack in the
language of Myers and Majiuf), which relaxes financing constraints and increases the value
of constrained firms. While all firms will experience a rise in value during an expansion,
constrained firms stock prices will be more responsive to the cycle. Jog and Schaller (1992)
find evidence in support of such a difference in a panel study of Canadian firms.
16In Table 9, we report data on the ratio of debt to the market and book value of equity,
respectively. We report data for both 1935 and 1936 to see whether the surtax affected
firms' financing decisions. By reducing taxable corporate income, debt finance would have
reduced a firm's surtax liability. Interestingly, using market value of equity, mean debt
ratios are higher in 1935 than in 1936 for each type, and median debt ratios are higher in
1935 than in 1936 for Type C firms, and differences in medians across types are statistically
significant (see Table 10). The lower mean debt ratios in 1936 likely reflect, in part, the
growth in stock prices in 1936, along with transactions costs of converting existing equity
into debt. Using the debt-to-equity ratios measured in book value, all types show an increase
from 1935 to 1936 in mean and median ratios, indicating an increased role for debt on the
margin.
An interesting feature of the data reported in Table 9 is the relatively high ratio of debt
to the market value of equity in the capital structure of high-surtax-margin firms in 1935 and
1936. One interpretation of the high debt ratios of high-surtax-margin firms is a greater
reliance on financial intermediaries, who finance through debt. Financial intermediaries
specialize in screening and monitoring borrowers, and therefore have a greater role in
financing firms whose prospects are not common knowledge)5 More generally, many
authors have argued that direct or intermediated debt contracts are likely to arise in
environments where asymmetric information about project opportunities or outcomes is
important.'6 In contrast, the literature on managerial entrenchment views debt as a
disciplinary device that limits managers ability to extract rents from firms (Jensen, 1986,
Hanka, 1992). According to this view, Type-C firms should have had lower debt ratios.
17To summarize, firm-level evidence on size, profitability, profit growth and stock price
changes, as well as aggregate data on the high flotation costs of publicly traded securities, all
support our focus on capital market frictions arising from asymmetric information as the
principal source of high costs of external finance for business fixed investment.
V. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR AND COSTS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE
Following the intuition of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), we begin our
empirical tests for the effects of differentially high costs of external finance on firm
investment within the Q-theory approach.17 It is well known (see for example Hayashi,
1982) that under assumptions of a constant-returns-to-scale technology and quadratic
adjustment costs, the Euler equation for the firm's choice of its capital stock can be solved
forward to obtain a linear relationship between the investment rate (investment I divided by
the beginning-of-period capital stock K) and marginal Q(usingaverage Qasa proxy):
(I/K) =a+ bQ1+ e1, (1)
where i and t denote the firm and time, respectively, a represents the normal or average level
of the investment rate, and b is the inverse of the coefficient on the quadratic adjustment cost
term. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, Qsummarizesmarket expectations about the
profitability of the firm's investment opportunities. e is an expectational error term. In
particular, adding extra terms as proxies for internal funds (e.g., anticipated cash flow)
known to the stock market should add no marginal predictive content for investment. That
18is, denoting anticipated cash flow' (net profit from operations less interest expense and
taxes) by CF, one would expect, under the null hypothesis of efficient êapital markets and no
cost differential between internal and external funds, that the coefficient c in the augmented
regression
(I/K),= a,+ bQ,, + c(CFIK),, + e1, (2)
should be zero. The Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen approach grouped firms into a priori
"constrained" and "unconstrained" sets based on long-run dividend payout patterns, and
tested for inter-group differences in the coefficients.
There are potential problems with this simple reduced-form approach, of course,
stemming from difficulties in measuring marginal Q,identifyingQasa reasonable proxy for
"fundamentals" owing to possible lapses of stock market efficiency (see for example Gulchrist
and Himmelberg, 1991), and specifying an alternative structural model in which internal net
worth variables appear (as in Hubbard and Kashyap, forthcoming). Nonetheless, we feel that
significant intuition is gained from the reduced-form approach, given our identification of
external finance cost differentials through firm-level responses to the surtax.
The surtax experiment gives a clear suggestion for identifying cross-sectional
heterogeneity: Firms with low surtax margins are a orion less likely to face differentially
costly external finance. Indeed, in many cases these firms turned to external markets to raise
funds in order to increase dividend payments, thereby reducing surtax payments. As we
19show in the Appendix, the maximum SUP margin can provide a measure of the shadow cost
of external finance.
In this reduced-form approach, firms in higher maximum SUP margins (those with
higher costs of external finance) will have greater sensitivity of investment to shifts in
internal funds, holding constant differences in cash flow and investment opportunities. We
investigate this proposition in Table 11, which reports results for two regressions with
investment relative to fixed capital as the dependent variable (i.e., the percentage change in
fixed capital from 1934 to l937).1 In both regressions the market-to-book value ratio (Q)
in1936 is included as a proxy for investment opportunities)9 The (CF/K) term is defined
as cash flow from 1934 to 1937, divided by fixed capital in 1934. The first regression
constrains the intercept and the cash-flow responsiveness of investment to be identical across
different types of firms, while the second regression allows the intercept and cash-flow
coefficient to vary across firm types. We report regressions that constrain the Qcoefficients
to be identical across types, as well as regressions that do not.
Our results provide broad support for the simple approach discussed above. In the
aggregated regression, both Qandcash flow enter positively and statistically significant at
the 1-percent level. The coefficient on Qislarge relative to previous estimates, indicating
lower adjustment costs than those implied in the estimates by Summers (198 1); Salinger and
Summers (1983); Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); and others. The results allowing
for surtax-margin heterogeneity reveal that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is
concentrated in the Type C firms. In all the regressions, Type A and B firms exhibit no
responsiveness of investment to changes in cash flow after taking account of investment
20opportunities measured by Q,butfor Type C firms the coefficient is large (0.27) and
statistically significant.2° Allowing for heterogeneity in effects of internal funds on
investment raises the R-squared of the regression from 0.11 to 0.21. These results are not
attributable to greater measurement error in QforType C firms (and hence greater marginal
information contributed by cash flow). If measurement error in Qwererelatively large for
Type C firms, then one would expect the coefficients on QforType C firms to be relatively
small. However, the opposite is the case. In regressions that allow the coefficient on Qto
vary by type, Type B and C firms have larger estimated Qcoefficientsthan Type A firms.
In the above analysis, we used the peak Qvalue(at the end of 1936) to minimize the
chance of finding a marginal contribution from cash flow. Still, one could argue that it is
inappropriate to include in the dependent variable investment for years prior to the
measurement of Q.Furthermore,cash flow measured after the date Qismeasured might
contain marginal information about future profitability, which coincidentally might have had
greater relevance for type C firms. We confront these potential problems by estimating (2)
using investment data for 1936 alone, and by using definitions of cash flow inclusive and
exclusive of contemporaneous data. Results from five such regressions are reported in Table
12, using the change in fixed capital from the end of 1935 to the end of 1936 as the
dependent variable, and using as regressors Qin1935 and, alternatively, the sum of cash
flow in 1935 and 1936, or cash flow in 1935. The results are quite similar to those in Table
11, although the coefficient on Qinthe single-year investment regression is predictably
smaller. As before, only Type C firms show significant responsiveness to internal finance
(inclusive or exclusive of current cash flow). The increase in R-squared due to
21disaggregation is even more pronounced than before. Once again, it is not appropriate to
interpret our findings as the result of differential measurement error of Qsincethe Q
coefficientsare larger for Type C firms.
We also tested for additional effects of cash flow on changes in working capital. Firms
with high costs of external finance and excess sensitivity of investment to changes in cash
flow will have an incentive to "self-insure' against variation in internal funds by
accumulating working capital during periods when cash flow is high and decumulating
working capital during periods when cash flow is low.2' If working capital serves as a
buffer to reduce the variation in fixed investment caused by variation in cash flow, then for
Type C firms, working capital investment will respond even more to changes in cash flow
than fixed capital investment.
To test this, we estimate a model similar to (2), but with the change in working capital
as the dependent variable (normalized, as throughout, by fixed capital). In this regression
there is no clear null hypothesis for the coefficient on cash flow (as there is in the Q-theory
model for fixed investment), but we find the heterogeneity of our reduced-form coefficients
on cash flow across the various types to be suggestive. Our results are reported in Table 13.
The coefficient on cash flow is much larger for Type C firms than for others, and it is nearly
double the comparable Type C firm coefficient in Table II. These results are consistent
with the view that firms with high external finance costs rely on working capital as a buffer
to reduce the effects of cash flow variation on fixed investment.
To summarize, we estimated versions of a neoclassical investment model controlling for
firms' investment opportunities using Tobin's Q.Theinclusion of proxies for internal funds
22could be rejected for firms which avoided high margins of the surtax on undistributed profits
by increasing dividends. For profitable firms with low dividend payout and high surtax
margins, we could not reject a reduced-form effect on investment spending of internal funds,
holding constant investment opportunities. These results are robust to changes in the
definition of internal funds --inparticular the use of only lagged internal funds --inthe
regressions, and are not explicable by appeal to measurement error in Tobin's Q.Finally,
high-surtax-margin firms show a much higher propensity to adjust working capital in
response to changes in internal funds, in a manner consistent with a buffer-stock view of the
function of working capital.
VI, MEASURED CAPITAL-MARKET FRICTIONS AND GROWING FIRMS
Using firms' marginal surtax rates we showed above that a simple formulation of the
effects on investment of financing costs and investment opportunities (through the Qmodel)
supports the economic and statistical significance of both. Consistent with models of capital-
market frictions, the investment of firms paying the highest rates of surtax was sensitive to
shifts in both firms' opportunities and internal funds.
These results would have come as no surprise to critics of the surtax, who argued that
young, growing firms with high costs of external finance bore the brunt of the tax. These
critics (see e.g., Merwyn, 1942; and Butters and Lintner, 1945), many of whom pushed for
repeal of the surtax from its inception, were particularly concerned about the surtax's effect
on growing industries. Table 14 reports the numbers of firms of Types A, B, and C for
each of the industries enumerated in the Survey of Listed Corporations, our data source.
23Also reported are (i) the fraction of firms in each industry that are in Type C and (ii) the
growth rate of the industry's fixed capital stock (measured in constant dollars) over the
period from 1937 to 1948. We calculated the latter to examine whether the industries with
significant representation of Type C firms in fact were (ex post) the 'growth industries of
the period.
It is not possible to make precise statements about the correlation of the importance of
Type C firms and industry growth because the industry classification reported in the data
does not match exactly the Census S.I.C. definition of industries. Nonetheless, some
patterns are noteworthy. The fixed capital stocks of the four industries with at least 50
percent of sample firms in Type C (agricultural machinery, aircraft, engines and turbines,
and tires) grew significantly faster than the average for the manufacturing sector.22 It is
also possible that other Type C firms were in relatively fast-growing segments of their
respective industries. To summarize, the characterization of Type C firms (the investment
behavior of which is affected by financial constraints) as being disproportionately
concentrated in growing industries appears to be accurate, providing support for concerns of
contemporary chroniclers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent theoretical models have linked firms' internal funds and investment spending in
environments where extemal funds are more costly than internal funds. An important
impediment to convincing tests of these models has been the identification of firm-level
differences in the costs of external finance. The Surtax on Undistributed Profits in the I930s
24offers a rare opportunity to measure the shadow price differential between internal and
external finance, and thereby, measure the importance of external finance constraints
associated with a "financing hierarchy" in determining investment behavior. In addition,
firm-level analysis of investment and financing costs for the 1930s provides complementary
evidence to Bemanke's (1983) time-series analysis, and can help to verify whether reeove
from the Depression was likely to have been delayed by high costs of financing investment.
Ourresultsmake some progress on both fronts. Nearly one-fourth of publicly traded
manufacturers in our sample had maximum SUP margins of 22 or 27 percent. The cash-flow
sensitivity of fixed investment by these firms alone accounts for the overall sensitivity of
investment to cash flow in our data, after controlling for investment opportunities. Many
firms with high surtax margins were concentrated in the growing industries of the day. The
sensitivity of capital spending to internal funds for high-surtax-margin firms appears to
reflect information-related capital-market frictions as opposed to the waste of corporate cash
flows by entrenched managers.
Our results also contain implications for fiscal and monetary policy. Our finding that
internal finance can have an important allocative role in investment implies that the social
costs of taxing firms' profits may include allocative distortions from reductions in internal
finance for some firms. These costs are borne disproportionately by young, growing firms
which suffer problems of asymmetric information. The high costs of external finance and
the existence of a financing cost hierarchy also lend credence to viewing changes in the
credit supply of intermediaes specializing in monitoring firms described above as an
important channel of monetary policy.23
25NOTES
I. See for example Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Hoshi, IKashyap, and Scharfstein
(1991).
2. Romer and Romer (1990) and Miron (1991) have stressed the value of historical policy
experiments in models of interest to niacroeconomists.
3. Indeed opponents of the surtax (which was only effective for two years) argued that it
discriminated against firms with limited (or costly) access to centralized securities markets (see
Butters and Lintner, 1945; and Kendrick, 1937). Contemporary chroniclers emphasized the effect of
bank failures and reduced credit availability from banks in increasing the shadow price of external
finance for many firms in the 1930s.
4. Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) report similar results for the pre-Federal Reserve period of U.S.
history. Temin (1989) uses panel data for investment to challenge Bernanke's view that costs of
credit were unusually high during the 1930s. Temin argues that if Bernanke's channel were important
industries with low concentration ratios (which Temin identifies as more vulnerable to increases in the
cost of credit intermediation), should have invested relatively less in the 1930s than at other times.
Temin finds no evidence to support this prediction, and therefore, dismisses the credit-cost
explanation of the Great Depression's unusual persistence. Clearly, it would be preferable to measure
investment response at the firm level using a direct measure of the shadow cost of external finance,
rather than rely on comparisons across industries using the dubious proxy of industrial concentration.
Indeed, as we show below, firm size (which motivates Temin's use of industry concentration) is a
very noisy indicator of external finance costs.
5. Another possible contributor to the intellectual current in support of the surtax was the
"liquidationist" school of thought, discussed in DeLong (1991). According to this school, depressions
were necessary times of upheaval in which reallocations of capital from low-productivity to high-
productivity uses occurred. The 'discipline' of external finance might have been valued as a means
to hasten such a transformation.
6. See also Ran,akrishnan and Thakor (1984).
7. For the sample of publicly traded firms we discuss in succeeding sections. only one in four firms
issued bonds in 1936. Given the low brokerage costs of bond issues and the tax reduction benefits of
debt, particularly in the presence of the surtax, it seems reasonable to interpet this low participation
rate as evidence that many firms simply did not qualify for the bond market. Other evidence supports
this conclusion. Ten percent of the firms in our sample accounted for 90 percent of firms' bond
issues. Participation rates in the bond market for large firms (those with assets greater than $100
million) were nearly triple those for other firms. The mean size of bond issuers was more than triple
the mean size of non-issuers. Finally, very few firms were "on the bond margin' in 1936. Only 11
firms in our sample of 273 increased outstanding bonds in 1936 or 1937, while 7 firms showed a
substantial decrease. Haven (1940, p. 7) argues that marketing restrictions on low-grade bonds
introduced by the Banking Act of 1935 effectively restricted bond issues by small corporations in the
mid-l930s.
268. As a technical matter, firms could circumvent payment of additional cash dividends by distributing
certain types of stock dividends (see Rolbein, 1939). Firms, however, had to prove that such
dividends" increased the effective claims of shareholders.
9. This may not be true for periods outside our sample which saw lower levels of gross investment.
Errors due to depreciation likely were reduced in importance by the high investment levels of 1935
and 1936.
10. An added advantage to using fewer groupings is the reductions in the possibility of measurement
error of type. Such errors might result from attempts by firms to disguise or reduce measured profits
to reduce the burden of the surtax. For example, in closely held firms, managers would substitute
direct compensation for dividends. Firms would also have incentives to increase advertising and
maintenance expenses if they thought the tax was temporary. Also, the expensing of some forms of
capital might have led some high-margin firms to accelerate some forms of capital investment. This
latter effect seems to have been important in explaining investment in oil drilling equipment, which
was expensed (see Hubbard and Reiss, 1988). Thus so long as firms faced upward sloping cost of
fund schedules, these various influences could lead us to underestimate some firms' external finance
costs. By having few categories of firms we minimize the bias that could come from such possible
mismeasurement. In fact, our regression results indicate substantial differences in behavior for Type
C firms relative to Type A and B firms. Thus, we believe that few of the highest-margin firms
avoid detection in our sample.
11. The large standard deviation for Type C asset size is attributable to 7 large firms at the 22
percent margin whose mean asset size in 1936 was $211 million.
12. The measured increases for all types in the ratio of net operating profits to sales is possibly
surprising given the incentives for firms to increase expenses to avoid the surtax (i.e., move forward
plans for advertising, and substitute executive compensation for owner-managers' capital gains). We
take this as an encouraging sign that errors in measurement of surtax margins as a consequence of
expense padding are likely to be small for most of our sample.
13. The values in Table 8 likely understate values for Tobin's Qinthe economy. In particular, the
average and median values reported in Table 8 are likely to be less than the true average and median
values of Tobin's Qbecauseof the difference between replacement cost and book value for firms in
1936. As Kuznets (1961, p. 480) shows, the price index for producer durables was 15 percent lower
in 1936 than in 1929, owing to the great deflation of 1929-1933. Since most capital was purchased
prior to the deflation, book value was far in excess of replacement cost.
14. The adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984), for example, does not predict whether
the average ratio of market to book value for pooled asymmetric-information firms will he above or
below one.
15. Mean ratios of bond debt to assets are essentially the same across types (0.03 for Type A and B
firms, and 0.04 for Type C firms). Thus differences in debt-equity ratios are mainly attributable to
short-term debt.
2716. Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986), and Lacker
(1990) have argued for the importance ofg pQrt asymmetric information. Townsend and Gale-
Hellwig show that when lenders find it costly to verify firm profits debt contracts will he useful as a
means of limiting the states in which verification is required. Diamond and Williamson show that
intermediated debt fut-ther can reduce costs associated with bankruptcy penalties and state
verification. Lacker shows that collateralized debt is a useful means of creating incentives for
accurate reporting of outcomes in environments where realizations cannot be verified by lenders.
Collateral provides a credible penalty on borrowers who fail to meet their promises because
borrowers valuethe collateral good more than lenders. These arguments predict that firms for which
information asymmetry is relevant should rely more on debt. Moreover, in models of ggflg
asymmetric information (for example, the adverse selection models of Myers and Majluf, 1984, and
DeMeza and Webb, 1987), debt is the optimal contract when firms differ unobservably in mean
returns to firm investments. Firms with higher expected project returns prefer debt because it offers
them higher expected profits, and low-returns firms are obliged to mimick the preferences of high-
returns firms. Some combination of and g￿j.pg asymmetric information that motivate higher
debt ratios (along with bankruptcy costs that limit optimal debt ratios), may help to explain the cross-
sectional differences in the reliance on debt.
17. An alternative approach to such tests is to estimate directly the Euler equation for capital
accumulation, as in Gilchrist (1990), Himmelberg (1990), Whited (1990), and Hubbard and Kashyap
(1990). We did not pursue this strategy, owing to difficulties in constructing a balanced panel with
data on firm financial and real variables over the 1935-1938 period.
18. One can also argue that the intercept terms should be lower for high-surtax-margin firms --that
is, that higher financing costs not captured by cash flow and Qshouldreduce investment for any
given levels of cash flow and Q.Indeed,we find that the intercept for net investment is zero for
Type A and Type B firms, but substantially negative for Type C firms.
19. We collected market-value data for firms in 1935 and 1936 only. Data for earlier years were
much more difficult to find.
20. As we noted before, the only intercept term that is significantly different from zero is that for
Type C firms, which is strongly negative (-0.16).
21. Fazzari and Petersen (1990) have argued that working capital piays an important role in allowing
firms to avoid costs of adjustment in fixed capital investment.
22. This does not imply that firms in Types A or B were only in slow-growing industries. The
capital stock of the petroleum industry grew rapidly over the period, and only relatively large, mature
oil firms were in the sample.
23. We have argued that the SUP offers a way to identify the incidence of financing constraints
across firms. Firm heterogeneity in responses of investment, employment, or production to changes
in monetary policy would provide another example (see Gertler and Hubbard, 1988; and Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1991).
28APPENDIX
APPROXIMATING THE SHADOW COST OF FINANCE USING THE SURTAX
It is possible to obtain an estimate of the cost differential between external and internal finance
using estimates of the maximum surtax rate paid, and other data. Consider the case of an all-equity-
financed firm, in which dividend payments do not affect the required rate of return on the firm's
equity (the 'tax capitalization" model of dividends and investment formulated by King, 1977;
Auerbach, 1979; and Bradford, 1981). Define the following variables:
p =taxableprofits,
D =dividends,
V= personalincome tax rate,
c =accrual-equivalentcapital gains tax rate,
=corporateincome tax rate,
y =dividendpayout rate (D/(1-t)p)
u =averagesurtax rate on undistributed profits,
s =costof raising a dollar in external funds,
q =shadowvalue of an additional dollar's investment,
V =valueof the firm.
Note that since after-tax profits are given by
(1-t)p —u(y)[(1—t)p —D],
an increase in dividends (dD) reduces the surtax liability of the firm by
[u(y) + (y-1)u'(y)] dD.
Consider an experiment in which a firm increases dividend payments by one dollar, while raising
an additional dollar of equity. The effect on firm value is given by:
29(i—v) +q(l—c)[u(y)+u'(y)(y—l)] -(I+s).
Thefirst term reflects the value to shareholders of an additionaldollar of dividends. Thesecond term
representsthe value ofreinvested savings from reduced surtax liability. The costof an additional
dollarof external finance is (1 +s). Note that if u=s=0, a firm wouldissue newshares only ifq >
Forour purposes, an interesting benchmark is the responsiveness to the surtax on undistributed
profits of firms initially paying near-zero dividends, for which y is near zero,




Poterba's(1987) estimates of c and v for1935(just prior to theimposition of thesurtax) are 0.06 and
0.24, respectively. Assuming a lower bound for q of (I +s) implies a cost premium for external
finance of at least 12 percent. If q =1.5,the implied cost differential is at least 24 percent.
Assuming q =1.5seems conservative. As we have argued, Type-C firms were often young,
high-growth firms. Moreover, estimates of market-to-book value reported in Table 8 show an
average for Type-C firms of 1.3 and a median of 0.98. Replacement cost for producer durables was
much lower than book value for these firms, whose equipment would have been purchased prior to
the great deflation of 1929-1933. Kuznets (1961, p. 480) estimates that the cost of producer durables
was 15 percent lower in 1936 than it was in 1929. Adjusting for iNs decline would raise the
estimated market evaluation of q for Type-C firms to a median of 1.16 and a mean oft .5, assuming
all capitalwaspurchased in 1929. Finally, in the presence of asymmetric information, as Myers and
Majluf (1984) argue, the true q, as known to insiders, could be substantially greater than the market
estimate. Thus a q value of 1.5, and an implied value for s of 24 percent for zero-dividend firms,
seems conservative.
30Our approachto estimating s is conservative for two additional reasons. First, we do not allow
anydirect effect from dividend policy to firm valuation (as models based on dividend valuation for
purposes of signalling or managerial discipline would imply). Second, for firms paying zero
dividends, our estimates are a lower bound because those firms are at a corner solulion.
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36Table 1
Retained Earnings an a Percentage of After—Tax Profits
mr Corporations with Positive Incoxe, 1931—40
)A,wIZionC).,w, in Theussn,)s ni Duller,)
$50 $100 $250$500 $1,000 $5,000 $10,000 $50,000
YearsUnder to to to to to to to and All.
$50 $100 $250$500 $1,000 $5,000 $10,000 $50,000 Over Classes
1931 57.3 47.8 39.1 12.1 26.4 21.5 13.9 11.1 3.7' 9.6
1932 39.9 31.5 31.6 28.8 26.1 20.8 12.6 7.6 8.9' 4.3
1933 64.0 66.5 61.461.356.547.139.4 22.2 2.5' 24.0
1934 53.7'57.1 52.645.534.9 25.8 28.5 3.513.9 19.7
1935 56.4 52.0 48.544.534.728.2 20.5 8.0 19.8 23.0
193635.8 28.423.822.725.825.922.315.64.915.1
193730.4 29.4 24.122.823.222.220.716.08.315.1
1938 50.6 54.8 48.339.337.829.523.716.87.319.2
193962.0 63.1 55.646.144.637.833.924.2 18.3 28.8
1940 62.2 59.2 56.451.250.144.3 39.030.1 22.3 33.2
Average51.13 48.0844.14 39.43 36.01 30.31 25.45 15.51 7.97 19.20
SOURCE' ButtonendLiens, (194$). P. 66. nn,npuwd Ira,,, Sin,ingicn n/Income.
)ndineweenesnens of dividend, over not prnlte dee ones.
77,ie loot rnprn,nnLs rnnlo.nnis) onrpnreinne only. bnneu,e of the ebenreul dividend, pnid by franc,,) csrpnnnsseefthis Masse 934.Table 2
Corporations Subject to Surtax on Undistributeci Profits, 1937
(Cbi6dby Highc: Surux Pd)
NetIncome Returns No 7% 12% 17% 22% 27%
Class With Net Surtax Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
(000s) Income (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
<55 119,805 19.2% 80.8% 0% 0% 0% 0%
5—10 18,611 34.7 39.4 8.9 10.4 6.6 0
10—15 9,150 38.0 32.4 5.6 6.1 7.4 10.7
15—20 5,697 40.0 27.4 7.5 8.3 4.7 12.1
20—2S 3,879 39.8 24.1 7.7 11.2 5.4 11.8
25—50 9,282 40.5 18.0 8.7 13.1 8.6 11.1
50—100 6,046 39.8 13.7 9.9 15.7 9.9 10.9
100—250 4,620 38.8 13.0 9.6 15.8 11.8 11.1
250—500 1,819 38.3 13.2 9.2 16.7 13.0 9.6
500—1000 1,071 36.4 13.813.8 17.6 10.2 8.1
1000—5000 974 42.2 15.1 11.8 16.5 9.4 4.9
>5000 240 43.3 15.8 17.5 16.7 5.0 1.7
SOURCE: Figurs .m drivxd from S:u:Lrtko cJ!ncornoJru 1937.Table 3
coatofFlotation for Coanoc Stock Issues Effectively Registered
for Sale to the Public by AssetSine of Issuer, 1938—1941
1938 939 (942 1941
Cost as a Coot as a Cost as a Cost as a
tise of Issuer No. Percentage Mo. Percentage Ag. Percentage Mo. Percentage
of Aseatent
(In millions) Issuestf Anount Issuesof Amount Issuesof Amount
Underar I lIen
onoor 01 9 27.30 Il 02.95 10 22.80 5 20.4%
01-5) 5 20.0 9 19.9 19 (5.9 Il
51-510 2 19.2 3 11,4 3 12.9
12.2 510-190 .. .. .. .. 6 10.4
190-0100 .. .. .. .. I 9.1 .. ..
51(0-5200 .. .. .. .. I 8.3 ..
Over 1200 .. . . ,, .. ., . .. ..
Monunderurit ten
Under II 44 21.70 36 24.10 31 24.4% 7 19.15
01-59 A 00.9 10 20,3 3 16.5 2 23.6
16.8 19-510 2 14.8 2 10.9 2 (6.4
010-550 .. .. I 4.8 ,. .. .- ..
4.4 190-5100 . . . . . . . . 9 2.2
5100-5220 . . . . . . - . - - - . . . .
over $200 .. . . .. .. .. .. ., ..
500870: lutters andi(ntner(1945), p. 97, fran SecuritIes and Roohenge Conetisslan, Cost of P(ntetisn fer
segistened Securities 1938-1939 (Aashington, The Cseesfssion, March, 1949), pp. 26, A21'A22, A45'44A; SEC Statfstlcal
Series Release Mo. 57±(June6, 1941), pp. A23-6241 .ini Release Mo. 715 (June 18, 1942), pp. 29'30. AU data refer so
issues proposed for sate by the issuer through iovesle.ent banking facilItIes,Table 4
Dividends Relative to After—Tax Profits, 1935 and 1936















































Type A Type B Type C All Firms
















Pre—Tax profit Divided by Book Value of Net Worth, 1936
Type A Type B Type C All Firms
Mean 0.126 0.161 0.130 0.137
Median 0.099 0.124 0.100 0.108
Standard deviation 0.095 0.106 0.094 0.099
Number of firms 127 80 66 273Table 7
Change in Net Operating Profits/Total Assets






















































































Ratio of Market—tO—BOOk Value, 1936 and
Its Percentage Change, 1935—1936
















































of Debt to Market Value of Equity
Type A TypeB Type C All Firms
1935
Mean 0.226 0.213 0.359 0.255
Median 0.068 0.075 0.177 0.088
Standard deviation 0.434 0.353 0.428 0.413
Number of firms 127 80 66 273
1936
Mean 0.178 0.188 0.255 0.199
Median 0.077 0.089 0.149 0.097
Standard deviation 0.272 0.287 0.267 0.276
Number of firms 127 80 66 273
Ratio of Debt toBookValueof Equity
1935
Mean 0.193 0.237 0.283 0.228
Median 0.109 0.112 0.209 0.138
Standard deviation 0.278 0.353 0.236 0.294
Number of firms 127 80 66 273
1936
Mean 0.220 0.260 0.334 0.259
Median 0.146 0.164 0.242 0.168
Standard deviation 0.252 0.316 0.274 0.280
Number of firms 127 80 66 273Table 10
Differences in Medians Across FirmTypes Tests of
Mediansand Mediansand 0Statistic
StandardErrors StandardErrors forDifference
TypeA TypeC inMedians of
T'flDes A & C


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Q(1936) —Ratioof Market-to-Book Value (1936).Table 14






Paper and allied products 3
Printing and publIshing 2
Newspapers arid periodicals 1
Construction arid mining
machinery 5
Metal worldng machinery 5
General industrial machinery 10
Engines and turbines 1












Paints and varnishes 0
Vegetable oils 2































































































Not,: The dewption of Typ. A TypeB,and TypeCsrms is ven Irt the text. Firm-level ir,lormahon and indusrry
definitions ar, taken from Survey of Listed Coiporsrions. Fixed capital stock data used in the calculations In the last mlustn are
taken from His1orcsJ Stadsttcs of tire tJnited States PoIume 2, p. 685. Series P 123-176).